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ABSTRACT
There are at least three dimensions to rights. We may have and lack freedom to 1) be, 2)
do,  and  3)  have.  These  dimensions  reformulate  Locke’s  categories,  and  are  further
complicated by placing them within the context of domains such as natural or civil rights.
Here the question of the origins of rights is not addressed, but issues concerning how we
may contextualize them are discussed. Within the framework developed, this paper makes
use of Actor-Network Theory and Enlightenment values to examine the multidimensionality
and appropriateness of animal rights and human rights for posthumans.  The core position
here is that rights may be universal and constant,  but they can only be accessed within a
matrix of relative cultural dimensions.  This will be true for posthumans, and their rights
will be relative to human rights and dependent on human and posthuman responsibilities.
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RESUMEN
Hay por lo menos tres dimensiones de los derechos. Podemos tener y carecer de libertad
de 1) estar, 2) hacer, y 3) tener. Estas tres dimensiones reformulan las categorías de Locke ,
y se complican aún más por su inclusión en el contexto de dominios tales como los derechos
naturales o civiles. Aquí la cuestión de los orígenes de los derechos no se aborda, sin em-
bargo sí se discuten las cuestiones relativas a cómo podemos contextualizarlos. En el marco
desarrollado por este artículo se hace uso de la teoría del actor-red y de los valores de la
Ilustración para examinar la multidimensionalidad y la adecuación de los derechos de los
animales y de los derechos humanos para los posthumanos. La posición central aquí es que
los derechos no solo pueden ser universales y constantes , sino que sólo se puede acceder a
ellos dentro de una matriz de dimensiones culturales relativas. Esto es cierto para los pos-
thumanos , y sus derechos serán relativa a los derechos humanos y dependerán así de las
responsabilidades humanas y posthumanas.
PALABRAS CLAVE
transhumanismo, derechos humanos, derechos naturales,, derechos animales, derechos civiles,
tecnología, filosofía política.
SUMMARY
Rights are nested in dimensions
Multidimensional rights exist in fields or matrices
Transhumanism challenges our traditional ideas about rights
Posthumans will be free to be, do, and have, just as humans and animals are
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SUMARIO
Los derechos se anidan en dimensiones
Existen derechos multidimensionales en los campos o matrices
El transhumanismo desafía nuestras ideas tradicionales sobre los derechos
Los posthumanos serán libres de ser, hacer y tener, al igual que lo son los seres humanos y
los animales
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Three kinds of rights
What is a right? In  The Social  Contract Rousseau correlates rights and liberty:  “When a
man renounces his liberty, he renounces his essential manhood, his rights, and even his duty
as a human being” (1960:175). Bertram (2010) emphasizes Rousseau’s correlation between
liberty and individual rights: “...such rights as individuals have over themselves, land, and
external objects, are a matter of sovereign competence and decision.” This connection runs
through many discussions of rights. Isaiah Berlin (2002: 171), in pointing out that freedom
and rights are predicated on survival:
“It is true that to offer political rights, or safeguards against intervention by the State, to
men who are half-naked, illiterate, underfed and diseased is to mock their condition; they
need medical help or education before they can understand, or make use of, an increase in
their freedom. What is freedom to those who cannot make use of it?”
The hungry or ill cannot make use of rights / liberties until fed and well.
We might say that humans have liberties in three dimensions. 1: We have the right to
“be”, to exist, and to maintain or change aspects of our identities: we are, and we can “be”.
2: We also have “doing” rights, such as the right to express opinions or to reproduce. We
can “do” stuff, and are free to take actions. 3: Rights to “have” are usually tied to survival,
such as the “right” to (have or have access to) clean water, or the right to bear arms, or the
right to healthcare; we have ownership or property rights. Being (BGR) and Doing (DNR)
rights are more often “natural”, while Having (HVR) rights are more often “civil”; HVRs
change depending on what  materials  are available  to have.  Few would claim that  HVRs
apply to the possession of gold, because gold is rare and not tied to survival; but we often
hear about a “human right” to water and even to weaponry for self-defense, on the grounds
that without these things our survival (our BGRs) is threatened. Similarly, a DNR may im-
pact an HVR (a right to “do” agriculture is predicated on the right to “have” food).
Locke posits that we have natural rights to “life, liberty, and estate” or to life, health, li -
berty, and possessions (Flikschuh 67; Locke 107). Life is an aspect of being, and health is
an aspect of, or quality, of life. We can place rights to life and health within BGR. Liberty is
central to all rights -- freedoms to be, do, have, etc.; but in the sense that we are at liberty to
do something or free to take an action, we can place liberty within DNR. The right to own
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property is HVR. As in Locke’s formulation, 3Rs are not inherently relational, in the sense
that  they do not  necessarily depend on relationship to  others  in  community (Flickschuh,
2007: 68), but, as seen below, they may be relational within certain contexts.
This illustrates the interdependency of BGR/DNR/HVRs. We could think of this set of
rights (call the set of BGR/DNR/HVR collectively “3Rs”) as a three-dimensional field of li -
berties.
Two possible domains among many
Paine’s notion that Civil rights (*CR*) arise from Natural rights (*NR*) is relevant. His po -
sition is that mankind’s “natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights” (30). This
will inform even our discussion of animal rights, though *CR* and *NR* are but two of an
indefinite number of possible domains.
Animals are sometimes reckoned to have some *NR*, but one would strain to think of
any example of animals being granted *CR*; animals may be protected from torture, but
they are not allowed to hold public office (excepting Caligula’s horse Incitatus and “joke
candidates” like Duke the Dog of Cormorant,  Minnesota).  We can say that  animals may
have 3Rs, but that they can only have them within the domain of *NR*. In her skepticism of
the way that “animal rights” is usually framed, Donna Haraway suggests that “plumbing the
category of labor” might be more useful for humans and for animals than talk of animal ri -
ghts.  The  “category  of  rights”  itself  has  an  “inevitable  preoccupation  with  similarity,
analogy, calculation, and honorary membership in the expanded abstraction of the Human”
-- and animals are not the same as humans (2008: 73). Animals cannot have human rights.
But maybe, Haraway hints, they could have other types of rights, or rights in other domains.
We could push her suggestion to say that animals have 3Rs in the context of “labor rights”
(*LR*).
It is also apparent that there are multiple *CR*s depending on the culture and country.
When considering all the variations of *CR*s, and alternative categories (how about a do-
main  that  exist  only between computer  hackers,  or  only within a  military order,  or  only
within a canoe on a private lake, etc.?) we can say that there is in effect an infinite (uncoun -
table) number of domains.  If so, *NR* becomes of greater and greater interest.  Is it the
only universal domain?  Is it embedded somehow within all other domains?  Such questions
are outside of our present scope, but an underlying assumption here is that rights,  natural
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rights if you like, are both universal and unchanging – though we may not yet have disco-
vered all of them, and we may believe we have discovered eternal rights which turn out not
to be.
Humans may be (or not be), may do (or not do), or may have (or not have) within *CR*,
*NR*, *LR*, or any number of domains. Humans have positions on the axes of the 3Rs in
some number of domains, but for many reasons we cannot recognize the 3Rs of animals in
all human domains; we will also have to wrangle with the recognition of 3Rs for artificial
life forms.
Posthuman Rights
Suppose that *NR* are the most fundamental domain in which one can have rights. Indeed,
if  animals might  have 3Rs within the domain of *NR*, then maybe other kinds of non-
human beings could,  too.  What  category of  entity does  not  have  BGR?  And if  a  thing
exists, does it have the right to continue to exist, and would such a right hinge on its being
more than a “thing”? Revisiting definitions of “animal”, Haraway’s discussion of Derrida is
useful. Only humans can be murdered, and all other living things are merely killed; only hu -
mans “respond” to conditions, and all other living things merely react (2008: 77-78).  This
is an a posteriori or a kind of realmetaphysik definition, a way of handling the fact of our
own discomfort with the empathy we feel for animals when we are yet unable to grant them
actual rights and responsibilities.
We are not as squeamish about robots or low-level “artificial intelligences” such as ex -
pert  systems  and  virtual  neural  networks,  and  we  still  understand  them  as  machinery.
Although computers and software may mimic real or fictional beings (as Hatsune Miku, an-
ticipated by William Gibson’s idoru Rei Toei, does), as tools they still share some essential
qualities with wheels and hammers.  Therefore, so long as they are merely machines, they
have no rights in any domain; they are not consciously engaged with as agents or social ac -
tors.  As we will see below, Actor-Network Theory disputes this because wheels, hammers,
artificial intelligences, and humans exist on a spectrum or within a network of what is cul -
tural;  social  actors  are  everywhere,  because  “the  social”  is  distributed  in  all  things  and
beings human interact with.
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Networks of Rights
Transhumanism is “man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibi -
lities of and for his human nature” (Julian Huxley quoted in Bostrom 2005). In discussions
of transhumanism, “posthumans” are “future beings whose basic capacities so radically ex -
ceed  those  of  present  humans  as  to  be  no  longer  unambiguously human  by our  current
standards” (Bostrom, 2003).
Actor-Network  Theory  (ANT)  complicates  the  position  of  machines  with  respect  to
human rights and rights generally because it asks us to consider that technology, animals,
and the natural world exist in a social network with humans which somehow “ensocials” the
non-humans.   Again,  it  acknowledges  the  impossibility of  sensibly differentiating  which
elements  in  a  network  are  human  or  non-human.  In  Bruno  Latour’s  formulation,  every
“thing” including living beings are compositions of relationships that exist within networks
(2007, 218). Even (perhaps especially) people are composite.  Consider the possibility that
rights and their domains, as we experience them, are compositions, too.
Example by way of thought experiment: Imagine a transhuman with a stigma.  She has a
surgically implanted RFID device in the back of her right hand, and a spontaneous and mi -
raculous wound which signifies her deepening theosis in her left palm.  The device gives
her the ability to open electronic locks at a distance, pay for coffees with hand-signals, and
generate healing isochronic beats for stress relief.  For her work in developing the device
(and her gumption and gall in having it implanted in herself) she has 3Rs within a specific
domain of a Transhumanist Association.  She can now call the Association to order, sanction
members, smoke in the boy’s room, and take Association cash for conferences abroad.
On the other hand, the stigma gives her a special place in her church. Suddenly she has
3Rs in the congregation that she did not have before. She now has the right to lead prayer
(DNR) and the right to own and wear a liturgical vestment (HVR). She even has the right to
be behind a sort  of neon iconostasis  -- a right that  women do not  have in this particular
church. She has a new BGR because of the appearance of her stigmata – the right to be in
the context of a church office. Without the stigma, she had no BGR in the domain of the
neon iconostasis, and we do not know if her 3Rs will change within the church if the stigma
disappears.  The  Association  grants  her  new 3Rs  after  the  advent  of  her  device,  and  the
church grants her new 3Rs after the advent of her stigma. Her 3Rs in the Association and in
the church are compositions.  In one domain, her rights are compositions of silicon, bravery,
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willfulness,  and ingenuity.  In  another  domain,  her  rights  are  compositions  of  grace,  sex,
prayer, and blood.
Posthuman rights,  like  posthumans,  will  be  compositions  in  Latour’s  sense,  and they
will be relative within or between domains. These domains will at first be human, or be cha-
racterized by the parent human culture.
Posthumans will have 3Rs in the *CR* domain insofar as their humanity is sufficiently
recognizable by the society in which they seek *CR*, and insofar as a human herself would
have *CR*.  For example,  if  the posthuman person in question is  so cyborgized that  she
cannot communicate, cannot move, and smells strongly of pickled fish, the society in ques -
tion may (wrongly) deny her the right to run for public office (either legally, illegally, or
alegally) through social  pressure or through violence or other coercion.  Also,  if  the pos -
thuman is not very cyborgized but happens to be gay,  she may not be allowed to legally
marry in her Persian village -- because she is gay, not because she is a gay cyborg.  Posthu-
mans  certainly  have  3Rs  within  *NR*,  even  if  they  are  less  human  and  more  animal,
machine, or some new composition. Their rights in this domain only become threatened if
they become too alien for us other (human) persons to comprehend. That is, they must not
become more alien to humans than animals or machines are.
Networks of Responsibilities
While protecting posthuman rights, the emphasis for posthumans may be on the corollary
responsibilities  within  rights’ domains.   In  other  words,  very powerful  posthumans  who
seem to become increasingly alien to their fellow humans, may have new responsibilities to -
ward  their  human,  posthuman,  and  ecological  communities.  This  should  not  be  to  place
responsibilities upon posthumans without also granting them rights; indeed, they must have
recognized and acknowledged *NR* and *CR* for them to have any responsibilities toward
humans or other posthumans in the *CR* domain. Humans must recognize the rights of pos-
thumans, whether posthumans have responsibilities toward humans or not.
To map out what such responsibilities may be, it is useful to turn again to the animals.
Rather than asking what responsibilities animals have in *NR* or any other domain (are we
ontologically shocked when even a “good” cat scratches a child?), consider what we owe to
them, if anything. Here is another asymmetry:  put posthumans in the position of humans
with full *CR*, and imagine that posthumans will regard humans as humans regard animals.
The archaic meaning of “husbandry” may help to illuminate. In its modern usage, it is
usually used to mean “animal husbandry” -- farming, breeding, building camel stock.  But
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its root comes from the Old Norse husbondi, which means the master or manager of a house
(Harper).  Husbandry has to do with protecting your family, land, and possessions. It  also
has to do with increase. To borrow from Swift, it could be said that a good husband is one
who can “make two ears of corn or two blades of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where
only one grew before” (1863: 161). The husband has a simultaneous right/responsibility to
care for his household, lands, and the inhabitants thereof. Husbandry, in this broad way (be -
yond  the  “animal  husbandry”  of  clinical  technicalities,  hormones,  gestation,  and  inter-
breeding of livestock), is the key to our relationship to the future. The future is not acces -
sible to us unless we survive and/or thrive into it. We must sustain, abide, put by; husbandry
is required for managing our own increase out of the present and into the future.
There is an element of the mean and mere in this if it only means surviving. Thriving re-
quires an increase that is not miserable.  To merely improve the quality and amounts of food
we eat is not enough; to merely produce more hens more efficiently is neither thriving for
henhood. The good husband creates the conditions for thriving, through thrift and work, and
maybe through fairness and loyalty, throughout the actor-networks.
In any case, husbandry is a network of responsibilities -- another composition. My fa -
ther, as a husband: was responsible to the neighbors bordering his three acres not to foul the
land; was responsible to his wife to be a good spouse; was responsible to his children to be
a good father; was responsible to our uncles to work together to cut firewood in the su -
mmer; etc. In his responsibility for the firewood, he was also responsible to the forest itself
not to cut too many trees.  This also served his own interests, and served his responsibilities
to his family, because we will always need firewood, and cutting too many trees means less
firewood next year. These compositions of responsibilities are probably always slightly out
of balance. Do they “naturally” seek to regain positions of relative balance, as the whole ne -
twork constantly shifts?  Adam Smith might have said they do, just as markets do.
In the short term, humans get to choose how to husband their own future, and the futures
of others in the actor-network, including posthumans. Posthumans are not the property of
humanity in the way that hens have become, and posthumanity can only come to be through
the self-direction of evolution by humanity. The posthuman will be the child of the human,
but it will be immediately adult and have adult rights and responsibilities in the same mo -
ment it comes to exist in the first place.
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Responsible Posthumans
Posthumans will have rights. Depending upon “how human” they are they may have 3Rs in
more or in fewer domains than humans do today. If rights are won within domains, posthu -
mans may find new domains in which to have 3Rs, or in which to limit the rights of others
(I’m the King of  The Moon,  suckers!  And you’re  all  my new Moon Butlers!).  But  with
greater powers than humans, the responsibilities of posthumans will be an important area of
debate. We may continually find ourselves wonderstruck that a posthuman Superman fails
to  feed the world’s  hungry,  or  at  least  permanently “fix” Metropolis’ own Suicide  Slum
(Evans, 2014). Our posthuman kin might act as engaged technocrats, aloof gods, or some-
thing  else  entirely,  but  the  matter  of  what  they  owe  regular  folks  will  become  more
contentious as they grow in power and in number. It would be wrong to leash a human or a
god, and it would be wrong to allow gods to leash humans; but we think it right to leash our
dogs to keep them out of traffic. This is why, again, future discussions of human rights for
posthumans may include moves toward framing posthuman responsibilities to humans.
Imagine a field of rights/responsibilities that fold 3Rs into corresponding responsibili -
ties. 3Rs plus responsibilities within a field = R3Rs. 3Rs can exist outside of all domains
except *NR*, but R3Rs exist within every domain except *NR* because no creature is res -
ponsible in general for being, for doing, or for having; but everyone has responsibilities to
use 3Rs appropriately in particular domains. So a man or a cyborg or a cat may be without
being responsible for his or its beingness. A man, a cyborg, or a cat may be a deacon within
a liturgical domain, but is responsible (has responsibilities) in a particular church.
Consider the state of posthumanism as a domain (*PR*). The careful definition of this
domain will be vital in articulating the nature of the relationship between humanity and pos -
thumanity. It will be an asymmetrical relationship, at first heavily favoring humans. It will
become, if the posthuman population (and/or their power or influence) grows, a domain in
which posthumans may favor themselves at the expense of humans, as humans favor the-
mselves at the expense of animals and machinery within their own domains and networks.
In this light, we must hope that the struggle to make sense of the dynamics of any poten -
tial *PR*s may positively impact the understanding of rights and responsibilities between
the composites we call posthumans, humans, animals, and machines.
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